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VOICE MISAPPROPRIATION IN CALIFORNIA-BETTE
MIDLER, TOM WAITS, AND GRANDMA BURGER
BY: EDWIN F. MCPHERSON*
On October 4, 2001, the California Court of Appeal, for the first time,
acknowledged, defined, explained, and confirmed the common law ofvoice
misappropriation in California. Unfortunately, only onejustice on the three
justice panel saw fit to tell the legal world the status of the law before the
parties had to go through the expense and uncertainty of a trial. The case is
Priority Records v. Superior Court (Geneva Burger). 1 As it turns out, the case was
settled during trial, for an undisclosed sum of money, and the California
Court of Appeal still has yet to make its voice officially heard.
When Prioritywas decided, the only common lawvoice misappropriation
cases in California were Federal cases, both decided by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, and both involving celebrity recording artists. On
October 4, 2001, the California courts finally interpreted their own law.
The interpretation is entirely consistent with the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation. Unfortunately, that interpretation will never be cited; in fact,
but for this article, it would never even be discussed.
The History Of Voice Misappropriation
MIDLER V. FORD MOTOR CO.
A claim for voice misappropriation was recognized for the first time in
California in Midler v. Ford Motor Co.2 Prior to Midler, an individual was
limited to recovering only for the misappropriation of his or her name or
likeness. In fact, the trial court in Midler granted summaryjudgment to the
defendants, indicatingthat "there was no legal principle preventing imitation
of Midler's voice . . . ." Midler was the first case that held that the
Edwin McPherson. is a partner of McPherson & Kalmansohn, a Century City California
entertainment litigation firm. The firm devotes much of its practice to right of publicity and right of
privacy issues. McPherson & Kalmansohn represented Priority in this case during the pre-trial and
appellate proceedings.
Priority Records v. Superior Court, Priority Records v. Los Angeles County Superior Court,
2001 Cal. LEXIS 8092 (Cal. Nov. 20,2001).
Case No. B15251; Geneva Burger v. Priority Records, et al., Los Angeles Superior Court
(Pomona) Case No. KC 027 869 (Hon. R. Bruce Minto, Judge).
2 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that California law recognizes a tort of appropriation
of a professional singer's voice where the singer was widely known and where the use was to sell a
product).
3 Id. at 462.
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misappropriation of an individual's voice could, in certain instances,
constitute an actionable violation of the common law right of publicity.
Bette Midler, a celebrated singer, dancer, actress, and comedienne, sued
an automobile company and an advertising agency for airing a commercial
that used a "sound-alike" of Midler singing a song from her album entitled,
"The Divine Miss M." Midler, when asked by the advertising agency to do
so, had expressly refused to sing the song in the commercial and, in fact,
(like many film stars) did not want to be involved or associated with any
commercial for any product.' The company then hired one of Midler's
former backup singers specifically and expressly to mimic Midler's very
distinctive voice. As a result, Midler was highly identifiable in the
commercial, even though neither her name nor a photograph of her had
been used.5
The court determined that Midler should be compensated for the
misappropriation of her voice, holding that, when "a distinctive voice of a
professional singer is widely known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a
product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs and have committed
a tort in California."6 The court stated that the great value of Midler's
distinctive voice to the advertisers was demonstrated by their diligent efforts
to ensure that the soundalike precisely imitated Midler's voice, and was
therefore widely recognizable as Midler. The court further stated that,
"when a voice is a sufficient amount of a celebrity's identity, the right of
publicity protects it."7
The Midler court made it quite clear that, in order to recovery for voice
misappropriation, it is not even enough that the aggrieved party is a celebrity;
even celebrity plaintiffs may not recover for voice misappropriation unless
their voice is "a sufficient amount of [their] identity."8
WAITS V. FRITO LAY, INC.
The court's decision inMidlerwas further explained in Waits v. Frito Lay,
Inc. 9 In Waits, the court reaffirmed the discussion in Midler, and further
explained the requirements set forth in Midler under which a celebrity can
successfully recover for the misappropriation of his or her voice.
4 Id. at 461.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 463 (emphasis added).
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
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In that case, Tom Waits, a well-known (celebrity) singer/songwriter/actor,
sued Frito-Lay for airing a radio commercial for Salsa Rio Doritos, which
featured a vocal performance imitating Waits. The court found that Frito
Lay had been very determined to use the specific sound ofWaits'extremely
distinctive, raspy voice. However, because Waits had been extremely
outspoken publicly about musicians not doing commercials (because it
"detracts from their artistic integrity"), Frito Lay used a soundalike whose
voice was (by design) virtually indistinguishable from Waits', and who was
recommended to the advertising agency as "someone who did a good Tom
Waits imitation" and had performed "Waits songs as part of his band's
repertoire" for over ten years. 1°
In fact, an executive producer with the advertising agency "became
concerned about the legal implications of [the singer's] skill in imitating
Waits, and attempted to get [him] to "back off' his Waits imitation." The
same executive producer admittedly had previously approached Waits to do
a Diet Coke commercial and "you never heard anybody say no so fast in
your life.""
The Waits court reiterated in Midler "that when voice is sufficient indicia
ofa celebrity's identity, the right ofpublicity protects against its imitation for
commercial purposes without the celebrity's consent." 12 The court held that
in order for Waits to recover under a right of publicity, he must satisfy the
deliberate voice misappropriation elements listed in the Midler case. for
which the Waits court identified as the "Midler tort." These elements
include (1) a voice; (2) that is distinctive; and (3) is also widely-known)3
The court found that "[a] professional singer's voice is widely known [for
purposes of voice appropriation, if the voice] ... is known to a large number of
people throughout a large geographic area."'4 In so determining, the court stated
that "identifiability is properly considered in evaluating distinctiveness.'
'
The court affirmed the judgment for Waits.
Once again, the Waits case makes it clear that just being a professional
singer does not give one the right to recover for voice misappropriation; the
voice also has to be known to a large number of people throughout a large
geographic area.
In Priority, Burger was not a professional singer; she was not a celebrity;
nobody other than her own grandsons and three other family members were
10 Id. at 1097.
11 Id. at 1098.
12 Id. citing Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
13 978 F.2d Id. at 1 lOOat 1102..
'4 Id. at 1102.
15 Id. at 1101.
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able to identify her in the Song. She certainly could not demonstrate that
her voice was distinctive or that her voice was widely known to a large number
of people throughout a large geographic area. In fact, as discussed above, the
trial court in Burger made a specific finding that Burger's voice is not
distinctive, that is not widely known, and that it has no commercial value
whatsoever.
That Burger's voice was not sufficiently identifiable to maintain a cause
of action for voice misappropriation was further demonstrated by additional
language in Waits:
Finally, we are unpersuaded by the defendants' argument that the
court's instruction would have allowed the jury to hold them liable
for imitation of a voice that was identifiable by only a small number of
people, in as much as Midler also requires that the plaintiffs voice be
"widely known." 6
PRIORITYRECORDS V. SUPERIOR COURT (GENEVA BURGER)
The Priority case was filed 11 years after Midler was decided and 7 years
after Waits. The case involved a 78-year-old grandmother, whose 30 year old
grandson's friend engaged her in a telephone conversation about marijuana,
taped that conversation, and gave an excerpt of that tape to a rap music
producer because he thought that the grandmother's words were funny.
The exact words used by Burger were: "When people are hooked on pot, can
they be sick if they don't get it?" (the "Excerpt"). The Excerpt was exactly
4 seconds long.
The grandson's friend was named Johnny Lupo. Lupo, who was an
amateur musician, compiled tapes of various people speaking, including
Burger, and brought the tapes to a rap music producer named Mark
D'Andrea to experiment on some new equipment that D'Andrea had
recently acquired. D'Andrea and Lupo decided to use the Excerpt in order
to create an original musical "beat."' 7
D'Andrea thereafter played the musical beat (with the Excerpt) for
Snoop Dogg (formerly "Snoop Doggy Dogg" -- real name: Calvin Broadus)
and C-Murder (real name: Corey Miller). D'Andrea thereafter produced
the Album, and included the Excerpt with this musical beat. Priority argued
that the Excerpt of Burger's conversation was obviously included in the song
6 Id. at 1102.
17 A "beat" in rap music is a composition of music, without the rap or lyrics which comprise the
completed song.
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for its content, and not for the uniqueness, distinctiveness, or identifiability
of Burger's voice.
Thereafter, a rap music recording artist named "Magic" (real name:
AtwoodJohnson) released an album entitled "Skys The Limit." The Excerpt
was used at the beginning of the thirteenth song on the album, entitled "No
Limit," which is about marijuana, among other things.
The Song was composed of original music, which was created by
D'Andrea, and original rap lyrics by three artists: Snoop Dogg, C-Murder,
and Magic. The album was released by No Limit Records, which is owned
by the rap artist Master P (real name: Percy Miller), and distributed by
Priority Records.
Priority distributed the album in accordance with a "furnishing"
agreement with No Limit. Because this agreement was only for distribution
of the Album, Priority had no right to control the content of the music.
Priority claimed that its sole function was essentially to manufacture the
plastic compact discs on which the music was recorded and to deliver those
discs to record stores.
At some point after the release ofthe album, Burger's grandson, William
Burger, informed Burger that her voice had been used on the Album.
Priority claimed (and Burger submitted no contrary evidence) that no other
individual in the world, other than four of Burger's own family members,
was able to identify Burger's voice on the Album, and the only reason even
they could identify her voice was because Lupo told them that her voice was
on the album.
In June of 1999, Burger filed a Complaint for invasion of privacy in the
Los Angeles Superior Court in Pomona, California. Nineteen months later,
after Burger's counsel associated in co-counsel, Burger filed a First
Amended Complaint, asserting causes of action for invasion of privacy,
intrusion, appropriation, use of wiretapped content, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The only cause of action that was alleged
against Priority was for "invasion of privacy - misappropriation," which was
later clarified by Burger's attorneys to mean common law voice
misappropriation. 8
Interestingly, Burger never sued Lupo, the individual who illegally taped
her telephone conversation with him. In fact, she never even sued
D'Andrea, the producer of the Album, who was actually responsible for
including the Excerpt on the Album. Although she did sue Johnson, the
18 Burger could not claim statutory misappropriation pursuant to California Civil Code Section
3344 because that cause of action requires proof of "knowledge," and Burger could not prove that
Priority had any knowledge that Burger's voice had been misappropriated, or that Priority had any
knowledge whatsoever concerning the origin of the 4-second Excerpt.
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artist (who had nothing to do with the inclusion of the Excerpt on the
Album), but she never pursued him. She did pursue Snoop Dogg (who
merely rapped on the song), C-Murder (who merely wrote some of the rap
lyrics), Master P (who merely owned the record company that released the
album), No Limit Records (the record company), and Priority Records
(which merely distributed the Album).
The case proceeded for over two years, with a considerable amount of
discovery. Immediately prior to trial, Priority filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication of Issues. In that
Motion, Priority sought to adjudicate that Burger could not maintain a cause
of action for voice misappropriation because she was unable to prove that
her voice was "distinctive" and "widely known."
Burger, in her Opposition papers, quoted extensively fromJ. McCarthy,
The Rights of Publicity and Privacy, and certain cases, none of which even
remotely had discussed voice misappropriation. Those cases and treatise
discussed the fact that, in name and likeness cases only, one need not be a
celebrity to recover damages for another's use of that person's name and
likeness.19
Priority's analysis was twofold: First, there is a separate tort in California
called "voice misappropriation." Although it may be a subset of statutory
misappropriation and/or common law right of publicity, Priority argued that
there are separate pleading and proof requirements for the more specific voice
misappropriation. The second part of Priority's argument was that, even if
voice misappropriation is not to be construed as a separate tort, the
"identifiability" element of common law right of publicity and statutory
misappropriation would nevertheless preclude Burger's claim against
Priority.
Priority argued that Midler and Waits established the tort of voice
misappropriation, and that those cases govern all voice misappropriation
cases in California. Priority further argued that not one case from any state
(and certainly none cited by Burger) held (or even suggested) that a non-
19 However, even in name and likeness cases (as opposed to voice misappropriation cases), the
plaintiff must be sufficiently "identifiable" to sustain a cause of action. Waits v. Frito Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d
1093, 11020 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Identifiability. .. is a central element of a right of publicity claimase").
There is an absolute requirement that a "significant" number of people be able to identify the plaintiff.
As discussed in J. McCarthy, Rights of Publicity and Privacy, which was extensively cited by Burger, the
author made it very clear that "the test of liability (as opposed to the scope of remedy) is whether a
'significant' or more than de minimis number of persons can reasonably identify plaintiff from the total
context of defendant's use." Id. at §3.4[D]. Three or four of Burger's family members (who already
knew her voice was on the Song), being the only ones who could identify her voice, is certainly "de
minimis," and clearly, as a matter of law, renders the voice not sufficiently identifiable to maintain a
cause of action for voice misappropriation (or any form of right of publicity).
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celebrity with a non-distinctive, not ividely known voice, particularly one with
no commercial value, can sue for voice misappropriation.
Burger admitted, on the one hand, that "[i]n California,Midler and Waits
establish that the misappropriation of one's voice is compensable", but
claimed that "Midler and Waits are completely inapplicable to the facts at
hand., 20  Priority argued that Burger could not have it both ways. It
definitely was Midler that established voice misappropriation as a
compensable tort. In fact, that is the reason for which the Waits court refers
to voice misappropriation as the "Midler tort." There was no recovery
whatsoever for the use of one's voice before Midler, and it is clear that Midler
and Waits are the last (and exclusive) word on the required elements of the
"Midler tort."
However, an argument that Burger made, seemingly almost "tongue in
cheek," was ultimately adopted by the trial court, to wit: that Midler and
Waits only apply to soundalike cases, and not to cases in which a plaintiff's
actual voice is used. However, there was nothing in Midler or Waits that even
remotely suggested that the rules set forth in those cases do not apply if the
case involves an actual voice as opposed to a "soundalike." Burger claimed
that "the 'analysis' is not whether a plaintiff can show that the voice is widely
known or distinctive, but only that the voice used is in fact the plaintiff's
voice - which here there is no dispute that it is her voice.'
However, in Midler and Waits, there was similarly no dispute as to whom
the voices were imitating, and the court still required that the "professional
singer's" voice be "widely known" and "distinctive." In fact, language from
those cases makes it clear that the court was not limiting its holding (and the
requisite elements for a voice misappropriation cause of action) to
"soundalike" cases. "This case centers on the predictability of the voice of
a celebrated chanteuse from commercial exploitation without her consent.121
"At issue in this case is only the protection of Midler's voice." 23 The court
did not say that the "case centers on the predictability of the voice of a
celebrated chanteuse from 'soundalikes' without her consent"; it said that the
heart of the Midler case was the protection of a "celebrated" singer from any
"commercial exploitation without her consent.924
0 Priority Recordsv. Superior Court, Priority Records v. Los Angeles County Superior Court,
2001 Cal. LEXIS 8092 (Cal. Nov. 20, 2001).(citing Opposition Papers filed in the case and referenced
at 11:2 and 3:3).
21 Id. citing Opposition Papers at 3:10-12.
2 See supra note 12.
2 Id. at 462.
24 Id.
2003]
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Clearly, neither the holdings of Midler and Waits, nor the requirements
identified therein, are limited to cases in which a soundalike was used, as
opposed to a plaintiff s actual voice. If a plaintiffs voice is not distinctive and
widely known to a large number of people throughout a large geographical
area, then that plaintiff simply cannot maintain a cause of action for
common law voice misappropriation, whether the defendants used a
soundalike or the plaintiffs actual voice.
The motion was ultimately heard by the trial court, which specifically
held that Burger's voice (1) was not distinctive; (2) was not widely known to a
large number of people throughout a large geographical area; and (3) had no
commercial value. The court further held, however, that, contrary to Midler
and Waits, Burger was nevertheless entitled to maintain her cause of action
for common law voice misappropriation because the requirements identified
in Midler and Waits only apply to soundalikes, and not to an actual voice.
At the end of the hearing, Priority made an oral Motion to Stay all
proceedings pending Appellate review, which it intended to seek on the
following week in light of the fact that the issue was solely one of law (and
because trial was imminent). Burger's counsel argued vehemently (if not
fatuously) that there was no question whatsoever that the Court of Appeal
would deny a petition for writ of mandate within two days of receiving it,
and that "justice delayed is justice denied." The trial court decided not to
rule on the oral motion to stay, and set the motion for hearing on the date
set for trial.
The next day, Priority filed a Petition for Writ of Mandate with the
Court ofAppeal, requesting an immediate stay of all proceedings, including
the trial, which was set for three weeks later. The issue presented in the
Petition was "whether an individual whose voice is not distinctive, is not
widely known to a large number of people throughout a large geographical
area, and has no commercial value can maintain a cause of action for
common law voice misappropriation?"
Four days before trial was to commence, the Second District Court of
Appeal, Division One, issued an Order staying all proceedings including
trial, and requiring Burger to file an Opposition Brief within 15 days
thereafter. Burger filed her Opposition brief, and Priority filed its Reply
thereto.
Two days after the filing of Priority's Reply brief, the Court of Appeal
issued an Order, stating very simply: "The petition is denied. The stay
previously issued by this court is dissolved." The Order was signed by
Justices Ortega and Mallano. The interesting part of the Order, however,
was what. amounted to, in essence, a dissenting opinion, which essentially
said that Priority is correct on the law; why make the company go through
a lengthy and expensive trial when there is only one cause of action against
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it, and we all know that any judgment on that cause of action will be
reversed.
Justice Miriam A. Vogel indicated the following:
"I would issue an order to show cause.
Priority Records, Inc. is named in only one cause of action (for
Right to Privacy -- Appropriation"). In that cause of action, Geneva
Burger ("an elderly widow") alleges that three other defendants
(Corey Miller, Percy Miller, and Calvin Broadus) used Burger's
voice (recorded during Burger's telephone conversations with her
grandsons) on their commercial compact disc ("Skys the Limit"),
that Burger's voice was identifiable (although she doesn't say by
whom), and that from this use, Burger sustained damage to her
peace of mind and dignity, as well as physical and emotional distress.
In my view, Priority Records' motion for summary judgment
should have been granted. As Burger concedes, her voice is neither
widely known nor distinctive. It is undisputed that she is not a
celebrity. For these reasons, she has no cause of action against
Priority Records.2 s
From these and other cases, it is clear that a plaintiff must be some sort
of celebrity or at least claim some degree of notoriety. For this reason, I
would issue an order to show cause and consider the issue now so that
Priority Records, a minimally involved defendant, is not dragged through a
lengthy trial with its attendant expense-particularly since no other causes
of action are alleged against this particular defendant.
Because it was clear to Priority that even the Court of Appeal agreed
with its position on the law of voice misappropriation, but did not want to
grant immediate, emergency relief pursuant to a writ of mandate, Priority
filed a Petition for Review with the California Supreme Court. The Petition
was ultimately denied by the Supreme Court, once again with a lone
dissenter, who "would grant review."
25 See Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc. (2001)) 25 Cal.4th 387, 405
[celebrity]; Lugosi v. Universal Pictures (1979)25 Cal.3d 813, 818 [the "tie-up" of a name to a saleable
product); Midler v. Ford Motor Co. (9th Cir. 1988) 849 F.2d 460,463 [distinctive voice of a professional
singer]; Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (9th Cir. 1974) 498 F2d 821, 825, fn. 11
[the greater the fame or notoriety of the identity appropriated, the greater the economic injury, but there
must be some proprietary interest to protect]; Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc. (1992) 978 F.2d 1093, 1102
["superstardom" not required to be "widely known"].)
20031
52 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol.11:43
As discussed above, the case proceeded to trial. Snoop Dogg settled out
before trial. The jury found in favor of Master P, but rendered a verdict
against Corey Miller and No Limit Records. Priority decided to settle the
case in the middle of trial for a substantial sum of money. The judge later
overturned the defense verdict in favor of Master P, after piercing P's
corporate veil, and entered a Judgment against P for $25,000 in
compensatory damages and $75,000 in punitive damages.
This case clearly proves the wisdom of Burger's counsel's earlier
statement: "justice delayed" is, most definitely, "justice denied."
26
26 See supra note 20.
